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In recent years, there has been a great deal of research on the relative merits of multi-
lateralism and bilateralism and their implications for the nature of the trading regime
between countries. In this paper we explore the scope of bilateral free-trade agreements
as a foundation for free trade, using recent developments in the theory of strategic net-
work formation.
We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are rms, which
can sell in the domestic market as well as sell in the foreign markets. The possi-
bility of selling in foreign markets depends on the nature of import taris faced by
rms. Countries can sign bilateral free-trade agreements which lower import taris
and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral
trade agreements. A prole of trade agreements denes the trading regime. We
study the nature of trading regimes that are consistent with the incentives of indi-
vidual countries. Our principal nding is that bilateralism is consistent with global
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a great deal of research on the relative merits of multilateralism
and bilateralism and their implications for the nature of the trading regime between countries.
Considerable attention has been given to the welfare eects of regional free-trade associations
and customs unions. A second set of issues concerns the incentives of nations to form such
associations; this pertains to the strategic stability of particular trading regimes. Relatively
little work has been done on this subject, specially concerning the stability of dierent free-
trade structures.
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This paper examines the incentives of countries to form bilateral free-trade
agreements and the eects of these agreements on the welfare of third parties. In our work,
we use a model which is inspired by recent developments in the theory of strategic network
formation.
We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are rms, which can sell
in the domestic market as well as sell in the foreign markets. The possibility of selling in
foreign markets depends on the nature of import taris faced by the rms. Countries can
sign bilateral trade agreements which lower import taris and thereby facilitate trade. We
allow a country to sign any number of bilateral trade agreements. The network of such trade
agreements denes the trading regime. We study the nature of trading regimes that are
consistent with the incentives of individual countries.
There are three direct eects at work when a pair of countries sign a trade agreement which
lowers import taris: one, the domestic rm is faced with greater competition from a foreign
rm, two, the domestic rm gets greater access to the foreign market and three, domestic
consumers benet from greater competition, in terms of lower prices.
In addition, there is an interesting indirect eect of such bilateral agreements: they make
the markets of the countries signing the agreement less valuable to other active rms in the
market. In a recent paper, Wilfred Ethier has termed this eect concession diversion. He
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There is some literature on the stability of dierent types of customs union arrangements. We discuss
this below.
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argues that the potential for concession diversion implies that bilateral trade agreements will
be unable to support liberal trading regimes.
We nd that concession diversion does arise when countries form additional bilateral trade
agreements. This eect should, however, be seen as a negative externality generated by
individual countries. Standard intuition suggests that there will be `excessive' incentives to
create agreements. This is what our analysis also reveals: in a symmetric setting, the latter
two direct eects dominate and countries have an incentive to form bilateral agreements. In
particular, we show that a complete network, i.e., one in which every pair of countries has
a bilateral trade agreement is a stable outcome. In our setting, bilateral trade agreements
lower trade taris to zero. Thus we show that bilateralism is consistent with free trade.
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Recent years have witnessed the growth of a voluminous literature on whether multilateral
trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT (and now the WTO) or a network of bilateral
preferential trading agreements (within the larger framework of GATT) is most conducive
to a movement towards global free trade and a maximization of world welfare. As noted by
Deardor and Stern (1997), bilateral trade agreements have a long history and have even
played a key role in the early rounds of GATT in forging a multilateral trade agreement. Our
results establish that the process of bilateral agreements can generate a free trade regime.
It is worth noting that the provisions of GATT allow preferential trading arrangements {
such as Customs Unions (CU) and Free Trade Areas (FTA) { under certain circumstances.
In particular, preferential trading agreements that are bilaterally negotiated between two
countries should not lead to an increase in tari duties on outside countries and should not
lead to a reduction in world welfare. One of our ndings is that if a pair of countries i
and j signs a bilateral free trade agreement then this induces them to lower taris on third
countries (which do not have a free trade agreement with either i or j). This in turn leads to
2
We have also considered the case of non-tari barriers, such as quotas. In this setting, each country rst
decides on the set of countries with whom it wishes to form bilateral free-trade agreements. Countries then
decide on the level of quota on those countries with whom they have no agreements. Finally, the rms sell
in the foreign markets and the home market. Our analysis of this case yields very similar results to those
reported for the tari case in the present paper. We would like to thank Francis Bloch for discussions on
the subject of non-tari barriers.
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an increase in the welfare of such countries. Thus bilateral agreements are consistent with
the spirit of GATT.
The principal contribution of our paper is the introduction of network games to the study
of international trading regimes. Our model of network formation is inspired by recent work
on strategic models of network formation; see e.g., Bala and Goyal (1999), Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Kranton and Minehart (1998). This approach allows us to explicitly
consider individual country incentives and the spillovers bilateral trade agreements generate
for third parties. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the rst application of
this approach to a study of the international trading system.
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We now elaborate on this approach. The simplest way to to do this to discuss the relationship
of our paper with that of Yi (1996). In his paper, Yi uses the theory of coalition formation.
This theory examines the strategic stability of dierent partititions of players: a partition
is a division of the players into mutually exclusive groups which collectively account for all
the players. This is a natural way of thinking about customs unions, since a country cannot
typically be a member of two customs unions. Our interest is in free trade agreements and
in this context the restriction to partitions is a strong one indeed. It rules out arrangements
such as the following: countries 1 and 2 have a bilateral free trade agreement and countries
2 and 3 have a similar agreement but there is no agreement between 1 and 3. Clearly, 1 and
3 have a dierent relationship as compared to (say) 1 and 2. Thus it is not appropriate to
view countries 1, 2 and 3 as one coalition. At the same time we cannot think of 1 and 2 and
2 and 3 being two distinct coalitions, since this violates the mutual exclusiveness property
of coalitions. The theory of network games provides a natural way to think of such issues,
since it allows for such intransitive relationships.
This is important since, in practice, the trading regime is characterized by such intransitive
relationships. For instance, Israel has bilateral free-trade agreements with the United States
and the European Community, respectively, but the latter two do not have such an agreement
between them. Similarly, the Mexcico has bilateral free-trade agreements with Bolivia and
3
For an application of network games to collaboration in oligopolies, see Goyal and Joshi (1999).
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Costa Rica, respectively, but the latter two do not have such a free-trade agreement (WTO,
1995).
This dierence in approach has implications for our ndings: Yi shows that the formation of
customs unions typically leads to an increase in the taris on third country products. This
is in contrast to our nding: we show that taris on third countries decline as countries form
additional bilateral agreements. This result is important due to the concerns of GATT.
Yi also shows that the rules of customs union formation are crucial: if open membership is
allowed, then the only stable customs union structure is the grand coalition, i.e., free trade.
However, under the rule that a union is formed if and only if all potential members agree
to its formation, then such a coalition cannot arise. We study the nature of stable networks
of bilateral trade agreements. A network is said to be stable if no pair of countries has an
incentive to form an additional trade agreement while no single country has an incentive to
dissolve any existing agreement. We show that the complete network, which supports free
trade, is strategically stable.
We now place our paper in context by relating it to the existing literature in the theory
of international trade. We rst mention some work on the inuence of trading structures.
In an early paper, Krugman (1991) demonstrates, in a model with dierentiated products,
that world welfare is minimized when there are three equal size customs unions. He does
not examine the stability of such an arrangement. Our results suggest that such symmetric
size groups are not strategically stable. Ethier (1998) argues that since a PTA between two
countries reduces the competitiveness of outside rms in the markets of these two countries,
leading to \concession diversion". This eect will undermine bilateral trade agreements and
they will be unable to support liberal trading regimes. In a recent paper, Maggi (1999)
argues that in an asymmetric environment with bilateral imbalances of power, a multilateral
institution such as the WTO can play a crucial role in verifying violations of trading agree-
ments and facilitating multilateral enforcements, although this argument loses force in a
symmetric environment. In a similar vein, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) argue that a FTA will
impede the implementation of an eÆcient multilateral trade agreement (though a CU under
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certain conditions may not). Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) illustrate the possibility that
PTAs may constitute \stumbling blocks" towards non-discriminatory trade liberalization.
In defense of bilateralism, Deardorrf and Stern (1997) argue that a multiplicity of countries
may nd it harder to reach consensus on trade issues. They also note that the result of
Krugman (1991) is biased against PTAs because the assumption of dierentiated products
implies that each country will be importing goods from every other country and this creates
a strong possibility of trade diversion with consequent reduction in world welfare. Instead,
in their model, the incentive to negotiate PTAs is based on comparative advantage. The
assumption that PTAs can only lead to symmetric trading blocs is also open to criticism
for in our network setup such a conguration will be unstable and will lead to individual
members in distinct trading blocs negotiating mutually protable bilateral trade agreements.
In response to Ethier, and Bhagwati and Panagariya, we nd that bilateralism can constitute
a \building block" leading to either a free trade regime or an almost free trade regime.
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These papers highlight the importance of trading agreements. Most of this work, however,
proceeds by xing some trading structure. In this paper, our interest is in the strategic
stability of dierent bilateral free-trade arrangements. We therefore develop a model where
any structure of trading agreements is in principle allowed. There is some research on the
strategic stability of dierent customs union arrangements; see e.g., Baldwin (1995), Bond
and Syropolous (1993), Kennan and Riezman (1990), and Yi (1996). To the best of our
knowledge the present paper is the rst study of the strategic stability of free-trade areas.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the basic model. Section 3
studies the basic model with exogenous taris and a single rm in each country. Initially
taris are prohibitively high. If two countries sign a trade agreement then taris between
them are brought down to zero. Taris between countries which do not have an agreement
remain prohibitive. In section 4 we examine generalizations of this model. In section 4.1
we allow countries to set the level of taris with non-agreement countries. We term this
the case of endogenous taris. Here we examine the eects of tari revenue on incentives
4
Spilimbergo and Stein (1998) also nd that a move towards PTAs can increase world welfare in a model
of comparative advantage if transport costs are considered.
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to form bilateral agreements. We also study the eects of bilateral trade agreements on
taris against third countries. In section 4.2 we study a model with exogenous taris and
oligopoly in each country. Section 4.3 examines the eects of market size on incentives to
form bilateral agreements. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a setting with N countries, each of which has one rm, which can sell in the
domestic market as well as sell in each of the foreign markets. A country's ability to sell in
foreign markets, however, depends on the level of import taris set by the dierent countries.
If two countries have bilaterally negotiated a FTA, then each oers the other a tari-free
access to its domestic market; otherwise, each imposes a non-zero tari on the imports
from the other. Given a conguration of FTAs, rms then compete in dierent markets by
choosing quantities. We are interested in the FTA network that emerges in this setting. We
now develop the required terminology and provide some denitions.
2.1 Network of Bilateral Trading Agreements
In this section, we formalize the notion of a network of FTAs and provide some denitions.
Let N = f1; 2; :::; Ng denote a nite set of identical countries. To avoid trivialities, we shall
assume that N  3. For any i; j 2 N , the pair-wise relationship between the two countries is
captured by a binary variable, g
ij
2 f0; 1g; g
ij
= 1 means that a FTA is established between
countries i and j while g
ij
= 0 means that no FTA is in eect. By denition, g
ii
= 1 8i 2 N
and g
ij
= g
ji
8i; j 2 N . A network , g = f(g
ij
)
i;j2N
g, is a formal description of the FTAs that
exist between the countries in N . Let G denote the set of all PTA networks. Two special
cases are the complete network, g
c
, in which g
ij
= 1 8i; j 2 N , and the empty network, g
e
, in
which g
ij
= 0 8i; j 2 N , i 6= j. Let g + g
ij
denote the network obtained by replacing g
ij
= 0
in network g by g
ij
= 1. Similarly, let g   g
ij
denote the network obtained by replacing
g
ij
= 1 in network g by g
ij
= 0.
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Let N(g) = fi 2 N : 9j 6= i; g
ij
= 1g. Each country in N(g) is involved in a FTA with
another distinct country in the network g. Therefore, N(g
c
) = N and N(g
e
) = ;. There
exists a path in g between countries i and j if either g
ij
= 1 or there exists a distinct set of
countries fi
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
n
g  N(g) such that g
i;i
1
= g
i
1
;i
2
=    = g
i
n
j
= 1. A network g
0
 g is
a component of g if for all i; j 2 N(g
0
), i 6= j, there exists a path in g
0
connecting i and j,
and for all i 2 N(g
0
) and j 2 N(g), g
ij
= 1 implies g
ij
2 g
0
. A component g
0
 g is complete
if g
ij
= 1 for all i; j 2 N(g
0
).
We will also let N
i
(g) = fj 2 N : g
ij
= 1g. N
i
(g) denotes the set of countries with whom
i has a FTA in the trade network g and includes country i. Let 
i
(g) denote the cardinality
of N
i
(g).
2.2 Demand and Cost Structure
In each country there is a single rm producing a homogeneous good and competing as a
Cournot oligopolist in all countries. In section 4.2 we consider the case where there are many
rms in each country. We let the output of rm j in country i be denoted by Q
j
i
. The total
output in country i is given by Q
i
=
P
j2N
Q
j
i
. In each country i 2 N , a rm faces an
identical inverse linear demand given by:
P
i
=  Q
i
;  > 0 (1)
Thus we are assuming symmetry in the nature of demand across countries. Section 4.3 briey
examines the eects of asymmetries in market size. All rms have a constant and identical
marginal cost of production,  > 0. We assume that  > .
Let T
i
j
(g) be the tari faced by rm i in country j in the network g. Note that T
i
j
(g) =
T
j
i
(g) = 0 if g
ij
= 1; however, in general, T
i
j
(g)  0 if g
ij
= 0. The social welfare of country
i 2 N is given by the sum of consumer surplus, rm's prots, and tari revenue:
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Si
(g) =
1
2
Q
2
i
(g) +
2
4
(P
i
(g)  c)Q
i
i
(g) +
X
j 6=i
(P
j
(g)  c  T
i
j
(g))Q
i
j
(g)
3
5
+
X
j 6=i
T
j
i
(g)Q
j
i
(g) (2)
2.3 Stable and EÆcient Networks
We employ a relatively weak notion of stability based on Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), which
is based on the idea that while FTAs are formed bilaterally, they can be severed unilaterally.
Formally, the network g is stable if for all i; j 2 N :
(i) S
i
(g)  S
i
(g   g
ij
) and S
j
(g)  S
j
(g   g
ij
)
(ii) if S
i
(g + g
ij
) > S
i
(g), then S
j
(g + g
ij
) < S
j
(g)
In words, in a stable network, each country has no incentive to sever an existing FTA with
another, and any two countries that are not involved in a PTA have no incentive to forge an
agreement.
In order to study eÆcient networks, we need to consider world welfare. For any network,
g, this is dened as the sum of social welfare of the N countries: S(g) =
P
i2N
S
i
(g). A
network, g

2 G is eÆcient if S(g

)  S(g) for all g 2 G.
3 The case of exogenous taris
Let the initial pre-agreement import tari in each country be T >  and let the post-
agreement tari be given by 0. The natural interpretation of such an agreement is as a
bilateral free-trade agreement. We suppose that taris remain prohibitively high between
countries that do not have a bilateral free-trade agreement. This is the sense in which taris
are exogenous. In section 4.1 we examine the case where countries adjust taris against
non-agreement countries.
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The assumption that T >  ensures that a rm i sells in country j if and only if there is
a trade agreement between the two countries. Therefore, 
i
(g) is also the number of rms
active in country i given the network g. If rm i is active in market j, then its output is
given by Q
i
j
= (  )=(
j
(g) + 1). The social welfare of country i is given by:
S
i
(g) =
1
2
"
(  )
i
(g)

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+
X
j2N
i
(g)
"
  

j
(g) + 1
#
2
(3)
An important concern in the literature has been the negative eects of (regional and bilateral)
free-trade agreements on third parties. One aspect of this eect is `concession diversion'.
The above expression allows us to examine the nature of concession diversion explicitly.
Fix a network g and a country i. Consider a country j 2 N
i
(g). The rm from country
j earns prots (   )
2
=(
i
(g) + 1)
2
from its operations in country i. Now consider what
happens when country i forms an additional bilateral trade agreement with, say, country
k. This allows the rm of country k to enter the market of country i, thus raising the
level of competition. In this new network g + g
i;k
, the prots of country j rm from its
operations in country i are given by ( )
2
=(
i
(g)+2)
2
. Suppose that j =2 N
k
(g). It follows
that prots from all other operations remain the same. Thus the eect of this additional
free trade agreement between country i and country k on the prots of rm j is given by
(   )
2
=(
i
(g) + 2)
2
  (   )
2
=(
i
(g) + 1)
2
. This term is negative: this is the measure of
concession diversion created by the new bilateral free-trade agreement.
The above observations concerning concession diversion suggest that bilateral links generate
negative spillovers for third countries. We should then expect that there are `excessive'
incentives for signing such agreements. The following result builds on this insight. It delimits
the class of networks that can be stable.
Proposition 1 A stable trading network is either a complete network or consists of two
components, one component has N   1 countries and is complete, and the other component
has a single country.
10
Proof Consider a network g in which g
ij
= 0. Note that a FTA between i and j leaves all
other markets unaected and raises the number of active rms in markets of country i and
j by one each. Therefore:
S
i
(g + g
ij
)  S
i
(g) =
1
2
"
(  )(
i
(g) + 1)

i
(g) + 2
#
2
 
1
2
"
(  )
i
(g)

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+
"
  

i
(g) + 2
#
2
 
"
  

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+
"
  

j
(g) + 2
#
2
(4)
Simplifying the above expression, we nd that S
i
(g + g
ij
)  S
i
(g) if:
2
2
i
(g)  5 +
2(
i
(g) + 2)
2
(
i
(g) + 1)
2
(
j
(g) + 2)
2
 0 (5)
It is easily seen that this inequality is satised if 
i
(g)  2, i.e. if there are two or more
active rms in the market. Thus, if country i is involved in one or more FTAs, then it has
an incentive to forge an additional FTA with j. This implies that in any network g, if i
and j have one or more bilateral trade agreements, then stability demands that they have
an agreement with each other as well. This means that any component in a stable trading
network must be complete. Further, in any stable network, there can be at most one non-
singleton component. Thus, if there are two or more components in a stable network, then
at most one of them is a non-singleton component.
We next show that any two countries in autarky have an incentive to form a trade agreement.
Suppose that a network g is such that i and j are in singleton components. Then, the
social welfare of these countries is identical and is given by S
i
(g) =
1
2
h
( )
2
i
2
+
h
( )
2
i
2
.
If i and j establish a FTA, then the social welfare of i (and j, by symmetry) is given by
S
i
(g + g
ij
) =
1
2
h
2( )
3
i
2
+ 2
h
( )
3
i
2
. It is easily veried that S
i
(g + g
ij
) > S
i
(g). Thus two
singleton components are not sustainable in a stable trading network.
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We have thus shown that the only candidates for stable trading networks are the complete
trading network and the network with a complete component with N   1 countries and an
isolated country.
4
Figure 1 provides examples of the networks that can be stable. The crucial step in the above
proof is the derivation of the inequality (5). This expression suggests that the incentives of
countries to have free trade agreements increase as they enter into more agreements. This
is a very strong and noteworthy property. It shows how bilateral trade agreements can be a
step toward a global free trade regime.
We discuss the intuition behind the stability of the network where (n   1) countries are
gathered in a complete network and country n is isolated. There are three eects when
an autarkic country forms a bilateral free trade agreement. The foreign rm can enter
the domestic market more easily. This increases domestic competition and thus increases
consumers surplus and lowers prots of own rm from domestic operations. The free trade
agreement also yields easier access to the domestic rm in the foreign market. This raises
prots of the domestic rm from foreign operations. The last eect is positive. However, if
the foreign country has a very competitive market than this eect is relatively small compared
to the large negative eect on prots of the (erstwhile monopoly) domestic rm. Thus the
overall eect of a bilateral free trade agreement can be negative. This prevents the autarkic
country from forming a bilateral free trade agreement.
The above result leaves open the question whether the complete network, i.e., free trade
regime, is actually a stable network. Our next result responds to this concern.
Proposition 2 The complete trading network is stable.
Proof Condition (ii) in the denition of stability is trivially satised since no further agree-
ments are possible. The social welfare to country i in the complete network is given by:
S
i
(g
c
) =
1
2
"
N(  )
N + 1
#
2
+
N(  )
2
(N + 1)
2
(6)
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By contrast, the social welfare to country i from a network g
c
  g
ij
is given by:
S
i
(g
c
  g
ij
) =
1
2
"
(N   1)(  )
N
#
2
+
"
(  )
N
#
2
+
(N   2)(  )
(N + 1)
2
(7)
It is easily established that if N  3, then S
i
(g
c
) > S
i
(g
c
  g
ij
). Thus, condition (i) of
stability is also satised.
4
What are the conditions for the unconnected network to be stable. In view of the intuition
given above, the argument hinges on the number of countries in the non-singleton component.
It is easily seen that the binding constraint is the incentive condition of the isolated country.
Let country 1 be the isolated country. Fix a network g in which this country is isolated and
all the other (n  1) countries are part of a complete component. Using (4) we can rewrite
the marginal payo to this country from a bilateral free trade agreement as follows:
S
i
(g + g
ij
)  S
i
(g) = 2  5 +
2(3)
2
(2)
2
(
j
(g) + 2)
2
(8)
In the case of the network g, it follows that 
j
(g) = n   1. Thus we can rewrite the above
expression as follows:
 3 +
72
(n+ 1)
2
(9)
Simplifying, we nd that this inequality is satised if and only if n  4. Thus we have shown
that the incomplete network is stable if there are 4 or more countries.
We briey comment on a political economy aspect of our analysis. Propositions 1 and 2 show
that if individual countries care about domestic social welfare then bilateral trade agreements
will generate a free trade regime or an almost free trade regime. This raises the question:
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what are the objectives of the governments? In this connection, we note an interesting but
distressing fact: the prots of individual rms under autarky are given by (   )
2
=4. By
contrast, the prots of this rm under any symmetric trading regime in which every country
has  active rms, are given by (  )
2
=( + 1)
2
. It is then easily checked that individual
rm's prots are higher in autarky. This suggests that the rm will have incentives to lobby
against bilateral free trade agreements!
We now examine the nature of eÆcient networks. The following result summarizes our
analysis.
Proposition 3 The complete network is the unique eÆcient network.
Proof: World welfare is given by S(g) =
P
i2N
S
i
(g). Using (3) this can be expanded and
written as:
S(g) =
X
i2N
1
2
"
(  )
i
(g)

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+
X
i2N
X
j2N
i
(g)
"
  

j
(g) + 1
#
2
(10)
World welfare is thus the sum of the consumers surplus in each country plus the producer
surplus of every rm in the world. It is convenient to express the latter term a little dierently
in terms of the sum of producers surplus generated in each of the dierent markets. Thus
we can write world welfare as:
S(g) =
X
i2N
1
2
"
(  )
i
(g)

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+
X
i2N

i
(g)
"
  

i
(g) + 1
#
2
(11)
In the complete network, the welfare generated in every country is the same and is given by:
1
2
"
(  )n
n + 1
#
2
+ n

  
n+ 1

2
(12)
By comparison, in an arbitrary network g, the welfare generated in country i is given by:
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"
(  )
i
(g)

i
(g) + 1
#
2
+ 
i
(g)
"
  

i
(g) + 1
#
2
(13)
We wish to show that (12) is larger than (13) for every i. It is easily seem that this is true,
for all 
i
< n. Since the network g was arbitrary, the proof follows.
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A comparison of our results on stability and eÆciency suggests that individual country
incentives are quite consistent with overall world welfare.
4 Generalizations
The results from the basic model are striking and motivate an examination of more general
settings. In this section, we examine three extensions. The rst extension allows for endoge-
neous determination of taris, on non-agreement countries. The second extension considers
the eects of a more general market structure in each country. The nal extension looks at
the role of market size in each country. In particular, we examine the incentives of small and
large countries to engage in bilateral free trade agreements.
4.1 Endogeneous Taris
In the above section, we considered the case where taris are either prohibitive or zero. In
reality, countries negotiate a range of trade agreements; moreover, the absence of an agree-
ment is usually not the same as prohibitive taris. An important motivation for examining
endogeneous tari determination is the GATT clause which requires that the regional trade
agreements not lead to an increase in taris/barriers against third parties. We wish to ex-
amine if individual countries have an incentive to raise taris with third parties as they form
additional trade agreements.
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We consider the following generalized model: In the rst stage, countries bilaterally negotiate
FTAs with each other. If two countries sign such an agreement then taris are set equal to
zero for trade between them. In the second stage, each country non-cooperatively chooses
an external tari to levy on those countries with whom it does not have a FTA. In the third
stage, rms in each country choose how much to produce for the domestic market and how
much to export to the foreign countries.
Let g be a FTA network. Note that T
j
i
(g) = T
i
j
(g) = 0 if g
ij
= 0. Further, since all countries
are ex-ante symmetric, Q
k
i
(g) = Q
l
i
(g) for all k; l 2 NnN
i
(g). Therefore, T
k
i
= T
i
for all
k 2 NnN
i
(g). The Cournot equilibrium outputs in country i are:
Q
j
i
(g) =
(  ) + (N   
i
(g))T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
; j 2 N
i
(g) (14)
Q
k
i
(g) =
(  )  (
i
(g) + 1)T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
; k 2 NnN
i
(g) (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) in (2) yields the following expression for social welfare in country
i:
S
i
(g) =
1
2
"
N(  )  (N   
i
(g))T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
#
2
+
X
j: g
ij
=1
"
(  ) + (N   
j
(g))T
j
(g)
(N + 1)
#
2
+
X
k: g
ik
=0
"
(  )  (
k
(g) + 1)T
k
(g)
(N + 1)
#
2
+ (N   
i
(g))T
i
(g)
"
(  )  (
i
(g) + 1)T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
#
(16)
Country i chooses its tari non-cooperatively to maximize (16). This yields:
T

i
(g) =
3(  )

i
(g)(2N + 5)  (N   2)
(17)
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Therefore, the optimal tari is a decreasing function of the number of bilateral links of
Country i. This is an important nding of our analysis. We provide some intuition for it
now.
A rise in taris has three eects: the rst eect is that it lowers competition in the domestic
market, thus increasing the prots of the domestic rm. The second eect is that, by lowering
competition, it lowers consumers welfare. The third eect is on the aggregate level of tari
revenue. To get some intuition for the above result let us look at the impact of an additional
FTA on each of these three eects. This impact is clearly reected in the rst derivative of
the social welfare function with respect to the tari level, which is produced below.
ÆS
i
(g)
Æt
i
(g)
=  
N   
i
(g)
N + 1
"
N(  )  (N   
i
(g))T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
#
+
N   
i
(g)
N + 1
"
2(  ) + 2(N   
i
(g))T
i
(g)
(N + 1)
#
+
N   
i
(g)
N + 1
[(  )  2(
i
(g) + 1)T
i
(g)] (18)
We note that a rise in the number of agreements from 
i
(g) to 
i
(g) + 1 has an impact on
the marginal cost of taris (in terms of higher consumer surplus lost) and at the same time
lowers the marginal benet (in terms of lower prots of the domestic rm and lower tari
revenue) from higher taris. The sign of the rst eect is unclear, but the latter two eects
are straightforward. An additional free-trade agreement means that there are fewer countries
on whom the tari is eective. Hence there are fewer rms aected by such a tari and this
means that the positive eect on the prot of the domestic rm is less marked. Relatedly,
fewer non-agreement countries means that the the pool from which the revenue is collected
is smaller, and at the same time the quantity response to increases in tari of the remaining
rms (in the non-agreement countries) is more acute. Both these pressures work toward
lowering the revenue gathering eects of higher taris. These considerations underlie the
relationship between the number of bilateral free-trade agreements and the level of taris on
goods from non-agreement countries.
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We next consider the impact of bilateral trade agreements on third country welfare. First
consider the case of a country k which does not have a bilateral trade agreement with either
country i or j in the network g. A FTA between i and j only aects the export prots of k
in the markets of i and j. After some simplication, the impact on such a country can be
stated as follows:
S
k
(g + g
ij
)  S
k
(g) = 9(  )
nh
Q
k
i
(g) +Q
k
i
(g + g
ij
)
i
+
h
Q
k
j
(g) +Q
k
j
(g + g
ij
)
io
(19)
Thus bilateral trade agreements have positive externalities on such unconnected countries.
Consider next the welfare of a country k which has a bilateral free trade agreement with
both i and j. It can be seen that such a country is only aected via the impact on its rm's
prots from export operations in i and j.There are two eects in these markets: rst, more
rms can compete without paying taris, and second, the taris on the remaining countries
fall. Both these eects make the market more competitive and thus lower the export prots
of rm k. This the extent of concession diversion and this adversely aects welfare of country
k.
Countries which have an agreement with i but not j (or vice-versa) fall in the intermediate
category: there is some loss in welfare due to concession diversion (in the country with whom
there is a free-trade agreement) but there is also increase in prots due to lowering of taris
in the other country. The combined eect? What is the aggregate impact on the world
welfare? We do not have an answer to this question yet.
Given the complexity of the computations involved, we have been unable to completely
characterize the nature of stable networks in this setting. We do have some interesting
partial results. These are presented next. The rst result shows that free trade is consistent
with stability.
Proposition 4 The complete network is stable.
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Proof: Since T

i
(g
c
) = 0, social welfare of country i becomes:
S
i
(g
c
) =
1
2
"
N(  )
(N + 1)
#
2
+N
"
(  )
(N + 1)
#
2
(20)
There are no links to add so condition (ii) of stability is trivially satised. Now consider the
network g   g
ij
and note that T

i
(g
c
  g
ij
) = T

j
(g
c
  g
ij
) = T

.
S
i
(g
c
  g
ij
) =
1
2
"
N(  )  T

(N + 1)
#
2
+
"
(  ) + T

(N + 1)
#
2
+
"
(  ) NT

(N + 1)
#
2
+ (N   2)
"
(  )
(N + 1)
#
2
+ T

"
(  ) NT

(N + 1)
#
(21)
It follows that:
S
i
(g
c
)  S
i
(g
c
  g
ij
) =
T

2
[2(  )(N   3) + T

(2N   3)] > 0 (22)
Therefore, condition (i) of stability is also satised. 4
More generally, we are able to obtain the following property of stable networks.
Proposition 5 Consider a stable network g. If for some i and j, 
i
(g) = 
j
(g) then g
ij
= 1.
Proof We rst note that since 
i
(g) = 
j
(g), then from the expression for optimal taris, it
follows that T

i
(g) = T

j
(g) = T and also that T

i
(g+ g
ij
) = T

j
(g+ g
ij
) = T
0
. Note also that
we can let   N   2 since the proof for  = N   1 is identical to the one demonstrating
that the complete network is stable. The change in consumer surplus, CS(g), is given by:
CS(g) =
1
2
"
(N   )T   (N      1)T
0
N + 1
# "
2N(  )  (N      1)T
0
  (N   )T
N + 1
#
(23)
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The change in domestic prots, 
i
i
(g), is given by:

i
i
(g) =
"
(N      1)T
0
  (N   )T
N + 1
# "
2(  ) + (N   )T + (N      1)T
0
N + 1
#
(24)
The change in tari revenues, 
i
(g), is given by:

i
(g) =
1
(N + 1)
[(N      1)T
0
f(  )  ( + 2)T
0
g   (N   )Tf(  )  ( + 1)Tg]
(25)
The change in rm i's prot in country j's market, 
j
i(g), is given by:

i
j
(g) =
"
(N      1)T
0
+ ( + 1)T
N + 1
# "
2(  ) + (N      1)T
0
  ( + 1)T
N + 1
#
(26)
To show that S
i
(g + g
ij
) > S
i
(g), we rst show that CS(g) + 
i
i
(g) > 0. From (23) and
(24), this requires showing that 2N( ) > 4( )+3(N )T +3(N  1)T
0
. Letting
  (2N + 5)  (N   2), this is equivalent to 2(N   2)( + 2N + 5) > 9(N   )( + 2N +
5) + 9(N      1). Noting that   N + 7, this is easily veried to be true. Next, we show
that 
i
j
(g)+
i
(g) > 0. For this, it suÆces to show that [(N     1)T
0
+ (+1)T ][2( 
) + (N      1)T
0
  ( + 1)T ] > (N + 1)[(N   )Tf(   )   ( + 1)Tg]. Simplifying, it
requires showing that 6(N     1) > (N + 1)(N   ). This is easily veried to be true for
  N   2.
4
The above proposition has several interesting implications for the nature of stable networks.
For instance, the empty network, g
e
is not stable. Similarly, a stable network cannot have
two or more singleton components. Finally, if there are two or more complete components
then they must each have a dierent number of countries.
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Our analysis of the exogenous taris case suggests that the sign of the expression S
i
(g +
g
i;j
)   S
i
(g) is crucial for an understanding of the nature stable networks. It is diÆcult to
identify down the sign of this term in general. We therefore used simulations to get some
idea of this expression. In our simulations we set n = 100,  = 200 and  = 100.
There are four dierent eects by an additional bilateral free-trade agreement, g
i;j
on country
i: the rst eect is on the consumers surplus in country i. The second eect is on the prots
of rm i in country j. The third eect is on the prots of rm i in its domestic market. The
fourth eect is on the tari revenue in country i. These eects are plotted respectively in
Figures 2a-2d. We note that the signs of the eects correspond to our intuition. The rst
two eects are positive, while the latter two eects are negative.
We aggregate these eects in Figure 3. Figure 3a presents the results when we set 
j
(g) = 1,
while Figure 3b presents the results when we set 
j
(g) = 100. These two numbers reect
the two extreme values for competitiveness in market j. Thus when 
j
(g) = 1, the market
is monopolized and hence very attractive for the rm from country i. When 
j
(g) = 100,
the market is very competitive and a free-trade agreement will not lead to any substantial
increase in prots of rm i from its enhanced access of market j.
Our simulations suggest that S
i
(g+ g
i;j
) S
i
(g) is positive at all levels of 
i
(g), if 
j
(g) = 1.
If 
j
(g) = 100 then the sign is positive for all values of 
i
(g) above a small number. Over all,
it seems that country i has an incentive to form bilateral free-trade agreements. Since this
country was chosen arbitrarily, this suggests that bilateral free-trade agreements should lead
to every pair of countries signing similar agreements, leading to the global free trade regime.
This result is broadly in conformity with the results in the case with exogenous taris.
4.2 Market Structure
In our basic model, we assumed that each country has a monopoly rm. In this section we
examine the case of a oligopoly in each country. The principal nding is that Propositions
1-2 are robust to this generalization.
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Suppose there are k  1 rms in each market. Fix a network g. We examine the incentives
of a country i to form a bilateral free trade agreement with a country j. We shall proceed
as in the basic model with exogenous taris; thus if two countries do not have an agreement
then they impose prohibitive import taris on each other's products. In this setting, we nd
the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose there are k  1 domestic rms in each market. A stable trading
network is either a complete network or consists of two components, one component has
N   1 countries and is complete, and the other component has a single country.
Proof: The crucial expression is S
i
(g + g
i;j
)  S
i
(g). With k  1 rms, expression (4) can
be rewritten as follows:
S
i
(g + g
ij
)  S
i
(g) =
1
2
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(  )(
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(g) + 1)k
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i
(g) + 1)k + 1
#
2
 
1
2
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(  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(g)k

i
(g)k + 1
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2
+ k
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  
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(g) + 1)k + 1
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2
  k
"
  

i
(g)k + 1
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2
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"
  
(
j
(g) + 1)k + 1
#
2
(27)
Simplifying the above term, we nd that S
i
(g + g
i;j
)  S
i
(g), if
2
2
i
(g)k
2
+ 2
i
(g)k   2
i
(g)k
2
  2k
2
  3k] +
2((
i
(g) + 1)k + 1)
2
(
i
(g)k + 1)
2
((
j
(g) + 1)k + 1)
2
 0 (28)
The second term is clearly positive. The rst term is positive and increasing in value for
all 
i
(g)  2. Thus any country that has a bilateral agreement, and has therefore 2K
or more rms, has an incentive to form additional agreements. This implies that in any
stable network, any two countries with agreements also have an agreement with each other.
Finally, it easily shown that if two countries are autarkic then they have an incentive to form
a bilateral free trade agreement. This completes the proof.
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4The nal result in this section shows that a stable network always exists; in particular, free
trade is consistent with bilateralism.
Proposition 7 The complete trading network is stable.
The proof of this result uses computations analogous to those of Propositions 2 and 6 and
is omitted.
4.3 Size of Countries
In the basic model we assumed that all countries had a a xed market size and that it was
the same across countries. In this section we briey examine the role of country size.
We parameterize country size in terms of the value of   . The rst observation concerns
the impact of increasing demand size in a world where all countries are of equal size. It
follows from expression (4) that market size enters as a multiplicative term in the overall
incentive to form links. Thus it enhances the overall eect of forming a link. For 
i
(g)  2,
this eect is clearly positive. In this sense, we may say that increasing market size encourages
countries to have more bilateral free trade agreements.
The other issue we wish to examine is the relative payos of large and small countries form
forming a link with each other. Recall that in the basic model with same country size, two
countries with equal number of links have the same returns from forming an extra agreement.
However, in case the countries are of unequal size the benets are unclear.
We shall suppose that there are two types of countries, large and small. Large countries have
a value of    > 0, while for small countries this value is exactly 1. Let country i be large
and country j be small. It is then straightforward to show that
S
i
(g + g
i;j
)  S
i
(g) = (  )
2
h
2
2
i
(g)  5
i
+
2(
i
(g) + 2)
2
(
i
(g) + 1)
2
(
j
(g) + 2)
2
(29)
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Similarly, the benets to the small country are given by
S
j
(g + g
i;j
)  S
j
(g) =
h
2
2
j
(g)  5
i
+ (  )
2
2(
j
(g) + 2)
2
(
j
(g) + 1)
2
(
i
(g) + 2)
2
(30)
Simple calculations then show that S
j
(g+ g
i;j
) S
j
(g) > S
i
(g+ g
i;j
) S
i
(g). Thus the small
country gets relatively larger benets when a large and a small country form a bilateral
free trade agreement. These computations suggest that we should expect to see relatively
more bilateral free trade agreements between large countries and between small and large
countries and few such agreements between small countries. This appears to be broadly in
line with the empirically observed pattern.
5 Conclusion
Our interest has been in the following question: what structure of free-trading areas is
consistent with the incentives of individual countries? We have developed a simple model of
network formation to analyze this question. In this model, the points are the countries and
the links between them represent bilateral free-trade agreements. We nd that a complete
network, i.e., one in which every pair of countries has a free-trade agreement and thus
global free trade obtains, is consistent with the incentives of individual countries. This
result suggests that bilateralism can be seen as a useful building step toward a liberal world
trading system. A related nding of policy relevance is that taris on third countries are a
declining function of the number of free-trade agreements a country has: this suggests that
bilateralism is consistent with one important element of the GATT.
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